EXHIBIT 8

116TH CONGRESS
1st Session

SENATE

REPORT 116-XX

(U) REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ON

RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE

IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION

VOLUME 5: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREATS AND

VULNERABILITIES

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

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,	` '	iews of Senators Risch, Rubio, Blunt, Cotton, Cornyn, and Sasse	
		iews of Senators Heinrich, Feinstein, Wyden, Harris, and Bennet	
		iews of Senator Wyden	

know the value of the contract. 4414

• Dmitri Rybolovlev: Psy Group undertook a separate "intelligence project" in 2016 for Dmitry Rybolovlev relating to a dispute with the art dealer Yves Bouvier. Walter Soriano linked Rybolovlev with Psy Group to find derogatory information on Bouvier, possibly by suggesting that Bouvier was using his art dealing to skim money from customers. The contract value was approximately \$150,000, and entailed Invop's conducting open source research on Bouvier. Burstien did not recall meeting Rybolovlev, though another Psy Group employee probably did, and stated that Soriano would have been present for that meeting.

iii. (U) Psy Group's Engagement with the Trump Campaign: Project Rome/D-Day

- (U) In the spring of 2016, Psy Group pitched an influence and intelligence project to the Trump Campaign through Rick Gates and Birnbaum. Referred to as both "Project Rome and "Project D-Day," the proposal was developed over several months, but ultimately never came to fruition, as described below.
- (U) On March 23, 2016, Kory Bardash, the head of Republicans in Israel, emailed George Birnbaum and Eitan Charnoff, a project manager at Psy Group, to virtually introduce them to each other. Bardash wrote: "I have spoken to both of you about the other. Hopefully you can have a mutually beneficial chat." 4418
- (U) Separately, on March 29, 2016, Birnbaum met with Rick Gates at the Mandarin Oriental hotel in Washington, D.C., having been introduced to Gates by mutual friend Eckart

^{4414 (}U) Attorney Proffer, Burstien, April 12, 2019.

4415
4416 (U) Attorney Proffer, Burstien, April 12, 2019.

4417
4418 (U) Email, Bardash to Birnbaum and Charnoff, March 23, 2016 (PSY000005–PSY000006).